Foreword
All praise belongs to Allah, who has elevated the status of the esteemed jurists (fuqaha). Their dedication to serving the pure and unblemished religion stands as a testament to their unwavering resolve. May infinite blessings and salutations be upon the final Prophet, Sayyiduna Muhammad (ﷺ), the beacon of trust for the pious. He is the one who led humanity from the darkness of ignorance to the luminous path of guidance. Likewise, may blessings be showered upon his noble family and the esteemed companions—those chosen, honored, and exemplary leaders. They are the radiant luminaries of guidance, whose steadfast commitment ensured the preservation of the pristine teachings of Shariah. On the Day of Judgment, their efforts will shine forth in full vitality.
The distinguished scholar, Shaykh Zayla’i (رحمه الله)—may his rank in Jannah be exalted—authored the unparalleled work Nasb al-Rayah li Takhrij Ahadith al-Hidayah. The present treatise was composed as an introduction to this masterpiece, hence its references in the foreword. This work stands peerless in the meticulous analysis of hadith-based legal rulings. No obstacle, lethargy, or reliance on others could deter its author, even for a moment, from his rigorous scholarly inquiry. He never hesitated to seek knowledge, regardless of its source, be it from his contemporaries or even those younger than him. His very nature was one of relentless pursuit—wherever knowledge resided, he sought it with unwavering dedication, day and night.
It is through such sincerity and rigorous research that this book has found a place in the hearts of hadith scholars. It occupies a niche in the field of hadith analysis that no other work has yet surpassed. It would not be an overstatement to say that ‘Allama Zayla’i (رحمه الله) left no stone unturned in his research. His exhaustive discussions in every chapter render the hadith evidence in his work beneficial to jurists of all schools of thought. Many of his contemporaries and even later scholars of hadith struggled to trace the primary sources of the narrations he cited, as most of these hadiths were scattered across rare and obscure texts. However, those who undertake research with similar dedication and perseverance may indeed uncover them.
Few scholars have ventured beyond their own legal positions to compile evidences from opposing viewpoints as well. The intellectual integrity to present both arguments and counterarguments with utmost fairness is a rare trait. Many have written books on hadith analysis within the framework of their respective schools of thought, but some fell short in their research, while others were influenced by personal inclinations. Inadequate research can render even a well-supported legal ruling seemingly weak, whereas blind adherence to one's desires leads to sectarianism and fanaticism—both of which are utterly unacceptable among the scholars of the faith.
The gravest peril in scholarly discourse is the unjust partisanship of one's school of thought, where strong positions appear weak and weak ones seem formidable. Solid evidence may be portrayed as fragile, while tenuous proofs are presented as robust. However, such distortions are unbecoming of those who sincerely fear Allah in matters of religion. For those who tremble at the thought of standing accountable before their Lord on the Day of Reckoning, such practices are inconceivable.
Therefore, if a hadith scholar is found who possesses both profound and expansive knowledge and is free from personal inclinations, one must hold onto him firmly. Such a scholar is like a rare and precious ruby—exceedingly scarce and invaluable. ‘Allama Zayla’i (رحمه الله) (d. 762 AH) was one such distinguished hadith master. That is why subsequent scholars of hadith have continually sought his guidance.
Figures such as Badr al-Din al-Zarkashi (745–794 AH), Ibn al-Mulaqqin (723–804 AH), and Ibn Hajar, among others, are revered for reaching the heights of scholarly excellence, seemingly rivaling the very clouds in their brilliance. However, if one compares their works to those of ‘Allama Zayla’i (رحمه الله), the truth of my statement will become evident. In fact, the superiority of his works will be even more apparent. One would be compelled to acknowledge that, free from sectarian bias, the breadth and depth found in his writings surpass those of others, arranged in an even more systematic manner.
In Nasb al-Rayah, the Hanafis will find the fundamental hadiths upon which their juristic rulings are established. The Malikis will discover therein the finest analyses selected by Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr (d. 463 AH) in al-Tamhid and al-Istidhkar, along with a concise presentation of the discussions found in the legal hadith compilations of Ibn al-Kharrat al-Andalusi (514–581 AH).
The Shafi‘is will find in this book authenticated reviews from al-Sunan, Ma‘rifah, and other works of Imam al-Bayhaqi (d. 384 AH). Additionally, they will encounter a refined summary of the discussions presented by Imam al-Nawawi (631–676 AH) in al-Khulasa, al-Majmu‘, and Sharh Sahih Muslim. Moreover, Nasb al-Rayah includes abridged presentations of the insights found in al-Ilmam and Sharh al-‘Umda by Ibn Daqiq al-‘Id (625–702 AH).
As for the Hanbalis, they will gain valuable insights from the critical methodologies presented in al-Tahqiq by Ibn al-Jawzi (510–597 AH) and Tanquih al-Tahqiq by Ibn ‘Abd al-Hadi (704–744 AH), among other significant works on the subject. In fact, with careful study, one will find in Nasb al-Rayah legal hadiths absent from the collections of Sihah (rigorously authenticated hadith compilations), Sunan (thematic hadith compilations categorized by jurisprudential topics), Masanid (hadith compilations organized by specific narrators), Athar (collections encompassing statements of the Prophet, Companions, and Tabi‘un), and Ma‘ajim (collections arranged by the names of narrators or geographical regions). Among these, Musannaf Ibn Abi Shaybah, a crucial reference for jurists, is particularly noteworthy, along with Musannaf ‘Abd al-Razzaq and other rare texts—what is missing in those books can often be found in Nasb al-Rayah.
Furthermore, Nasb al-Rayah provides detailed commentary on each hadith, drawing from the evaluations of hadith narrators by expert scholars of Ilm al-Rijal (biographical evaluation) and referencing the major works on hadith defects (‘Ilal). This is what grants this book its unparalleled distinction among works of hadith analysis.
In praising Nasb al-Rayah, I do not intend to discourage others from their scholarly pursuits. Nor do I deny that Allah bestows deep knowledge upon those who demonstrate unwavering dedication. I fully acknowledge that many later works contain valuable insights and beneficial discussions. With perseverance and commitment, one can acquire even more refined knowledge from authentic sources.
What I have stated about Nasb al-Rayah is, in essence, an expression of reverence for knowledge and the rightful acknowledgment of a deserving scholar. I seek only to highlight the remarkable stature of ‘Allama Zayla’i (رحمه الله). He was the only Hanafi hadith scholar to have undertaken such a monumental intellectual endeavor—an achievement that became a source of admiration for both his contemporaries and later generations of jurists.
Both teachers and students of Nasb al-Rayah will come to a firm conviction that the Hanafis, in every respect, are ardent adherents of hadith and Athar (reports from the early generations).
However, there have always been those in the world—driven by ignorance or sectarian bias—who criticize the Hanafis. At times, they take issue with the practice of ijtihad (independent legal reasoning) in cases where no explicit scriptural text exists, failing to recognize that jurisprudence itself is founded on ijtihad. At other times, they claim that the Hanafis possess fewer hadiths, ignoring the reality that Hanafi hadith scholars have contributed extensively to the global hadith tradition. Some even allege that Hanafis engage in istihsan (juristic preference), equating it with the unauthorized creation of new laws.
However, once one understands the Hanafi definition of istihsan, such accusations hold no ground. Moreover, how can those who acknowledge qiyas (analogical reasoning) reject istihsan? The only Lawgiver is Allah, and the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) was the one who conveyed divine legislation. The role of jurists is merely to analyze and extract rulings from the scriptural sources. Thus, those who portray jurists as independent legislators fundamentally misunderstand both Shariah and jurisprudence—they have lost their way, distorting divine law into a human invention. However, Allah’s law is above any human interference in its revelation or establishment. He remains utterly pure from such attributions.
In the present book, I have aimed to refute such baseless criticisms. Therefore, I have discussed qiyas, ijtihad, the Hanafi stance on istihsan, and their criteria for accepting hadith. Additionally, I have shed light on the scholarly dominance of Kufa— the cradle of Hanafi jurisprudence—in the fields of Quranic interpretation, hadith sciences, Arabic linguistics, jurisprudence, and legal theory. I have sought to demonstrate that Kufa served as the nucleus of Islamic jurisprudence in the Eastern lands, from where its luminous wisdom spread across the world.
Through this book, I have also established that, in comparison to other schools, the Hanafi tradition possesses distinct scholarly advantages, particularly in the field of hadith. From the earliest days of Islam until today, Iraq—especially Kufa—has produced a distinguished lineage of hadith scholars, and among them was Imam Abu Hanifa (رحمه الله). Additionally, the Hanafis are renowned for their precision in understanding legal nuances and their depth in interpreting meanings—an aspect even their critics and students of Ilm al-Rijal (narrator criticism) have been compelled to acknowledge.
Sufficient for me is Allah, and He is the best disposer of affairs.
Qiyas and Ijtihad
There exist both praiseworthy and condemnatory hadiths regarding qiyas (analogical reasoning). The type of qiyas that is condemned is that which originates from human desires and whims, whereas the praiseworthy qiyas is the one through which newly arising legal issues are resolved by drawing analogies with established rulings found in the Qur’an and Sunnah, following the methodology of the noble Companions, the Tabi‘un, and the Tabi‘ al-Tabi‘in.
The majority of hadiths—both those that praise and those that censure qiyas—along with their contexts, have been documented by al-Khatib al-Baghdadi (رحمه الله) in his renowned work Al-Faqih wa al-Mutafaqqih. Hafiz Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr (رحمه الله) has also compiled similar material on this subject. The well-established principle in this regard is that the eminent jurists among the Companions, Tabi‘un, and Tabi‘ al-Tabi‘in have unanimously supported praiseworthy qiyas. In other words, deriving solutions for newly emerging issues through rigorous research based on the Qur’an and Sunnah is a matter of consensus (ijma‘), and there exists no scope for its denial.
Imam Abu Bakr al-Razi (رحمه الله) (305–370 AH), in his work Al-Fusul, after mentioning the views of the juristic Companions and the Tabi‘un regarding qiyas, states that over time, a group emerged that was ignorant of the principles of jurisprudence and its fundamentals. These individuals had no knowledge of the methodologies and approaches of the predecessors, yet they did not refrain from following their own ignorance and base desires. As a result, they opposed the Companions and the Tabi‘un who succeeded them.
The first to reject qiyas and ijtihad in newly arising matters was Ibrahim al-Nazzam (رحمه الله). (He was, in fact, a hidden heretic whom not only Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama‘ah but also various other misguided sects declared a disbeliever. He passed away around 211 AH.) He even criticized the Companions for their use of qiyas, uttering highly disrespectful remarks against them. This wretched individual went to the extent of contradicting the very praises and divine satisfaction that Allah had bestowed upon the Companions, acting recklessly and imprudently.
Later, a group of philosophers in Baghdad followed the views of Ibrahim al-Nazzam. However, unlike that heretic, they refrained from openly criticizing the predecessors or declaring them mistaken. Instead, in order to counter their opponents and deny the necessity of ijtihad and qiyas, they adopted a deceitful strategy. They argued that when the Companions permitted ijtihad and qiyas in newly emerging issues, it was merely for mutual reconciliation and arbitration rather than a necessary or definitive ruling. Through such ignorant claims, they sought to validate their own opinions while evading the controversy that Ibrahim al-Nazzam faced for rejecting the judgments of the predecessors.
Subsequently, an ignorant individual named Dawud ibn ‘Ali al-Zahiri blindly followed their path. In reality, he had no knowledge of what the Companions and their followers had said regarding qiyas, nor was he aware of the counterarguments of its deniers. He merely gathered some statements from al-Nazzam and some from the Baghdad philosophers who rejected qiyas, and from them, he sought to prove that qiyas and ijtihad were impermissible. Yet, he was entirely unaware of the arguments for and against qiyas. Dawud went even further by rejecting the validity of human reason altogether, asserting that no aspect of religion could be understood through intellect. By doing so, he effectively reduced himself to the level of quadrupeds—or rather, to a status even lower than them. (This concludes the excerpt from Al-Fusul by Abu Bakr al-Razi رحمه الله.)
Abu Bakr al-Razi (may Allah have mercy on him) has eloquently established the authoritative nature of Ijtihad and Qiyas, leaving no room for refutation regarding the validity of Qiyas. Thus, every jurist (Faqih) is required to engage in praiseworthy and commendable Qiyas and Ijtihad, which reflect the subtlety of their understanding and the depth of their knowledge. It is for this reason that Ibn Qutaybah (may Allah have mercy on him), in his book Kitab al-Ma'arif, discusses jurists under the heading Ashab al-Ra’y (practitioners of Qiyas). He includes among them great Hadith scholars such as Imam Awza’i (88–157 AH), Sufyan al-Thawri (107–198 AH), and Malik ibn Anas (93–179 AH) (may Allah have mercy on them all).
Similarly, Muhammad ibn Harith al-Khushani (d. 361 AH) (may Allah have mercy on him) refers to the students of Imam Malik as Ashab al-Ra’y in his book Qudat Qurtuba. Hafiz Abu al-Walid ibn Faraji (d. 403 AH) also follows the same approach in his work Tarikh Ulama al-Andalus. In Muwatta Malik, there is a Hadith regarding al-Da' al-Udhal (a chronic disease), which some interpreted as referring to Abu Hanifa and his students. However, Hafiz Abu al-Walid al-Baji (d. 474 AH) refuted this interpretation, asserting that Imam Malik never criticized Ahl al-Ra’y (the jurists) in this Hadith; rather, his remarks were directed towards certain Hadith narrators concerning the authenticity of their transmission. Similarly, Ibn Abd al-Barr (d. 463 AH) states in Intiqa’ that none of Imam Malik’s students from Ahl al-Ra’y have ever attributed such criticism to him regarding Imam Abu Hanifa. Many other scholars have likewise affirmed the esteemed status of jurists, but listing them all here is unnecessary.
From this, it is evident that the Hadith condemning opinions arising from personal whims and desires should not be applied to jurisprudential discourse. Furthermore, it is improper to label the process of deriving rulings for new, continually emerging issues by aligning them with the Quran and Hadith as reprehensible Qiyas. Such an assertion would be a grave mistake and lacks any Shar’i foundation.
Ascribing the term Ahl al-Ra’y specifically to the Hanafis is justified only in the sense that they exhibit exceptional expertise in Ijtihad. After all, Fiqh was practiced both in Madinah and Iraq, and Qiyas was utilized in all regions. Jurists only differ in their methodologies and conditions for Ijtihad, but they unanimously accept the authority of the Quran, Hadith, Ijma’ (consensus), and Qiyas. None of them limit themselves to a single source; rather, all four are considered valid legal evidences.
A Muhaddith is someone who specializes in narrating Hadith, whereas a jurist (Faqih) is akin to a physician who diagnoses and prescribes remedies. Imam A’mash (431–512 AH) described Muhaddithun as resembling pharmacists, while jurists are like doctors. The real issue arises when weak jurists among the Muhaddithun attempt to issue fatwas without proper expertise. This concern is highlighted by Hasan ibn Abdur Rahman al-Ramahurmuzi (may Allah have mercy on him) in his book Al-Muhaddith al-Fasil, as well as by Ibn al-Jawzi (510–597 AH) in Talbis and Akhbar al-Humqaa. Khateeb al-Baghdadi (392–463 AH) also makes similar observations in his book Al-Faqih wal-Mutafaqqih, where he lists certain unqualified Muhaddithun.
In Sharh Mukhtasar al-Rawdah, a foundational work on Hanbali jurisprudence, Sulayman ibn Abdul Qawi al-Tufi (671/72–736 AH) states that anyone who relies on their reasoning when deriving legal rulings is, in a linguistic sense, among Ahl al-Ra’y (those who use Qiyas). In this regard, all scholars are included because no Mujtahid can completely avoid employing intellect and contemplation, whether in Tahqiq al-Manat (identifying the basis of a ruling) or Tanqih al-Manat (refining the basis of a ruling).
(Tahqiq al-Manat entails two aspects: First, when the original ruling is well-established through consensus or explicit Quranic or Prophetic texts but requires Ijtihad for implementation. For example, hunting wild donkeys while in a state of Ihram necessitates compensatory sacrifice, which is established by the Quran and Ijma’. However, determining a similar compensatory animal requires Ijtihad. Second, when the reasoning behind a ruling is explicitly stated in the Quran or Hadith, and jurists apply Ijtihad to identify other cases where the same reasoning applies. For instance, the Prophet (peace be upon him) stated that cats are not impure because they coexist with humans. Here, the stated reason is cohabitation with humans. Jurists then use Ijtihad to extend this reasoning to other animals like mice, cockroaches, and lizards, concluding that they, too, are pure. Tahqiq al-Manat is essential in Shari’ah, as the Quran and Hadith cannot explicitly mention rulings for every individual and scenario.)
This hadith prescribes the emancipation of a slave as an expiation for engaging in conjugal relations during the daytime in Ramadan. However, other similar circumstances also exist, which must be identified by the jurists in light of the broader objectives and principles of Shariah. For instance, in the narration, the questioner was a rural man. Yet, the ruling is not exclusively applicable to him alone. This is because Shariah rulings are not confined to specific individuals but rather encompass general applicability (ʿām).
After the tribulation of "Khalq al-Qur'an" (the theological controversy in the 2nd century Hijri regarding whether the Qur'an is created or not), the term "Ahl al-Ra'y" (People of Opinion) became a specific designation in the terminology of the hadith scholars, referring to Imam Abu Hanifa and his followers from Kufa.
Some hadith scholars have been excessively harsh in their criticism of Imam Abu Hanifa. By Allah! The accusations they have levied against him are entirely baseless, and I consider him completely free from such imputations. The correct stance regarding Imam Abu Hanifa is that he never opposed any hadith out of mere contrariness. Rather, the instances where he diverged from certain hadiths were due to his ijtihād-based reasoning. His differing opinions were backed by clear and sound evidences, which are readily available today. However, many of his critics have failed to exercise fairness in their judgments. Even if he erred in his ijtihād, he would still earn a single reward, while if he was correct, he would receive double the reward. Those who rebuke him are either driven by envy or ignorant of the principles of ijtihād.
Moreover, reliable narrations indicate that Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal's final stance on Abu Hanifa was praiseworthy. This is documented in the book Usūl al-Dīn by the Hanbali scholar Abul-Ward. Likewise, Allama Shihab Ibn Hajar al-Shafi'i (d. 909 H) writes in Khayrāt al-Hisān (p. 29) that later Shafi'i scholars referred to Abu Hanifa and his followers as "Aṣḥāb al-Ra’y" (People of Opinion). However, one must not assume that this designation was intended as a criticism. Nor should one falsely interpret it as implying that Hanafis prioritized personal reasoning over the Sunnah of the Prophet or the statements of the Companions. They are, in fact, completely free from such allegations.
He then clarifies the methodological approach of Abu Hanifa and his followers in jurisprudence: first, they seek evidence in the Qur'an; if not found, they turn to hadith; next, they refer to the statements of the Companions. Through this analysis, he refutes the claims of those who oppose the Hanafis.
I do not deny that some hadith scholars have criticized jurists, particularly Abu Hanifa and his followers. This, however, stems from the fact that the Hanafis omitted certain hadiths that their critics were unaware of in terms of their flaws. The misconception arises because these critics assume that the Hanafis abandoned those narrations in favor of personal reasoning. Furthermore, they often fail to grasp the fundamental principles employed by the Hanafis when deriving legal rulings. This inability stems from their own intellectual limitations and their failure to comprehend the depth of the Hanafi methodology. As a result, in their frustration, they resort to accusations, claiming that jurists prioritize qiyās (analogical reasoning) over hadith. However, such allegations do not diminish the credibility of the jurists; rather, they only cause distress to the accusers themselves.
One of the staunchest opponents of qiyās was Ibn Hazm al-Ẓāhirī (384–456 H), who outright rejected any form of analogical reasoning. Like other proponents of qiyās, the Hanafis were a particular target of his criticism. However, Abu Bakr Ibn al-ʿArabi (468–543 H) delivered a strong rebuttal to Ibn Hazm’s stance in his book al-ʿAwāṣim wa al-Qawāṣim. Ibn Hazm had no definitive proof to substantiate his rejection of qiyās. Instead, he relied on conjecture while disregarding explicit statements from the Companions affirming the validity of qiyās. Moreover, he audaciously attempted to authenticate weak narrations that seemingly opposed qiyās.
One remarkable phenomenon of our time is that a certain journalist, deprived of the company of scholars, has turned his newspaper into a platform advocating for an unusual ideology—one that lacks any fundamental basis or logical conclusion. Ten years ago, he authored a booklet titled Usūl at-Tashrīʿ al-ʿĀm, wherein he compiled the opinions of Ibn Ḥazm regarding the rejection of qiyās. Alongside these, he also included some arguments from proponents of qiyās. However, his method of presentation did not adhere to the approach of the esteemed imams. Additionally, he incorporated a collection of isolated opinions, forming the foundation of his ideology merely upon personal inclinations—accepting what he found agreeable, even if it starkly contradicted the clear directives of the Qur'an and Sunnah. In this manner, he amalgamated mutually contradictory principles, leading to inconsistencies in jurisprudential matters. Such an endeavor can only be undertaken by someone of an unstable nature, akin to an attempt at producing a human from the womb of a cow or another animal.
In his attempt to reject qiyās, Ibn Ḥazm cited a hadith narrated by Nuʿaym ibn Ḥammād, a transmitter whose narrations are deemed unreliable by the majority of hadith scholars. Ibn Ḥazm seemed unaware of this, while even minor hadith scholars of the East recognize this fact. The hadith in question states: "My ummah will divide into more than seventy-two sects, the most misguided of whom will be those who derive legal rulings through qiyās based on their personal opinions." (Musnad al-Bazzār: 2755). Furthermore, the chain of narration includes Ḥāriṯ (d. 163 AH), a narrator known for his innovation. Interestingly, the aforementioned journalist mistakenly recorded his name as Jarīr! Moreover, he attempted to present another hadith beyond Ibn Ḥazm’s argument, stating: "Everything among the Children of Israel was in order until the offspring of foreign or captive women emerged. They issued verdicts based on their own opinions, leading themselves and others astray." (Sunan Ibn Mājah: 56). According to this journalist, this hadith is of ḥasan (fair) status, whereas the chain of narration includes Suwayd (d. 81 AH), about whom Imam Yaḥyā ibn Maʿīn (158–233 AH) stated: "It is permissible to execute him." Imam Aḥmad also deemed his narrations as discarded. Even the lenient critic Shihāb Bursīrī classified him as ḍaʿīf (weak) in his work Miṣbāḥ al-Zujājah.
Furthermore, the chain includes another narrator, Ibn Abī Rijāl, whom Imam al-Nasā’ī labeled as rejected and Imam al-Bukhārī described as munkar (unacceptable). Some assume that jurists are divided into two categories: Ahl al-Ra’y (People of Opinion) and Ahl al-Ḥadīth (People of Hadith). However, this division is baseless. It is merely an assumption of later generations, derived from the statements of certain ignorant narrators who emerged after the Khalq al-Qur’ān controversy. When Ibrahim al-Nakhaʿī and some of his contemporaries referred to Ahl al-Ra’y as adversaries of the Sunnah, they were referring to those who opposed the established beliefs passed down through generations. These were groups such as the Khawārij (those who rebelled against ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib), the Qadariyyah (who denied predestination), and the Mushabbihah (who likened Allah to His creation).
Jurists engaging in ijtihād on secondary jurisprudential matters were never the intended target of such statements. Any misunderstanding in this regard would be a misinterpretation of the phrase. Moreover, how could this be the intended meaning when the very individuals who made these statements—such as Ibrahim al-Nakhaʿī and Saʿīd ibn al-Musayyib (d. 93 AH)—themselves employed qiyās in legal rulings? This reality may be distressing for the opponents of qiyās, but it is the undeniable truth. Ibn Ḥazm, being a Ẓāhirī, sought to invalidate all reports from the Companions that supported qiyās, particularly attempting to discredit a narration from ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (RA). However, similar narrations have been transmitted through multiple sources with close wording, including by al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī and others. In fact, similar reports exist from other Companions as well.
Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, in his book al-Fiqh wa al-Mutafaqqih, cites the hadith narrated by Muʿādh ibn Jabal (d. 18 AH) in favor of qiyās. He further states that the phrase "narrated from Muʿādh by multiple students" indicates that the hadith was widely known and transmitted by numerous reliable narrators. The integrity, piety, and asceticism of Muʿādh are well established, and naturally, his students were also devout, trustworthy, and pious. Some scholars have reported this hadith through an unbroken chain, transmitted by ʿUbādah ibn Nuṣay and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Ghanm from Muʿādh. This chain is muttaṣil (uninterrupted), with all narrators being widely recognized for their reliability. Furthermore, leading scholars have accepted this hadith as evidence, indicating their conviction in its authenticity.
Even more comprehensive discussions on this topic can be found in Fuṣūl by Abū Bakr al-Rāzī. I have previously referenced some of his statements regarding the opponents of qiyās. There is no need for an extended discourse on qiyās here, as what has been presented is sufficient, God willing. Those desiring a deeper examination of the chains of narration supporting qiyās may refer to Fuṣūl by Abū Bakr al-Rāzī and al-Fiqh wa al-Mutafaqqih by al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī. These works will clarify the reality behind the speculative assertions of the Ẓāhirīs concerning hadith when attempting to reject qiyās.